July 11,2024
Inquiry of the Battle at Kibbutz Be’eri
IDF: The presentation of the operational inquiry regarding the battle at Kibbutz Be'eri was completed today (Thursday). The findings were presented to the members of the Be'eri community, the families of the hostages abducted from Kibbutz Be'eri, and the bereaved families. The inquiry was summarized by the Chief of the General Staff LTG Herzi Halevi and was subsequently presented to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Yoav Gallant.
The inquiry team determined that the IDF failed in its mission to protect the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri; the bravery of the Be'eri residents and the members of the kibbutz's civilian rapid response team is commendable and was crucial in stabilizing the defensive line during the first hours of combat, preventing the attack from spreading to other parts of the kibbutz.
In the attack on the kibbutz, 101 civilians were killed, and 30 hostages from Kibbutz Be’eri and two additional hostages were abducted and taken into Gaza, 11 of whom are still being held in Gaza. The security forces who fought in the area operated with great bravery and heroism. During the battle, 31 security personnel fell, including 23 IDF soldiers and members of the civilian rapid response team and eight officers of the Israel Police. Many soldiers and civilians were also injured.
The findings reveal that approximately 340 terrorists infiltrated the kibbutz, including about 100 Nukhba terrorist operatives of Hamas, who carried out murderous massacres, abductions of hostages, looting, and other brutal crimes. According to updated estimates from the inquiry team, about 100 terrorists were eliminated within the kibbutz. The houses in the kibbutz sustained heavy damage, and the recovery process for the kibbutz is expected to take a long time.
The inquiry was conducted by Maj. Gen. (res.) Mickey Edelstein and members of the inquiry team, including Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Dr. Oded Megiddo, Major (res.) Dror Engelstein and Captain (res.) Shir Dani.
The members of the team are not part of the chain of command and were not involved in the events themselves.
The inquiry, which lasted around three months, included hundreds of hours of conversations and interviews with the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri, members of the civilian rapid response teams, and security forces that operated in the area during the initial days of the war. Thousands of data points and materials were collected to create as clear and accurate a picture of the events as possible. As part of this, the team members gathered recordings of all communications of the security forces, examined communications among kibbutz members (with their consent), and collected supplementary intelligence and interrogation materials from terrorists captured at the beginning of the war. Additionally, the team compiled video footage, observation records, and field reconstructions. The inquiry was conducted in collaboration with the Israel Security Agency (ISA) and the Israel Police, whose forces operated in the kibbutz as well.
The inquiry is an operational military inquiry that focuses on the sequence of events, combat management, and the conduct of the security forces. It examined the battle in Kibbutz Be'eri, which was one of dozens of combat focal points during the surprise attack on October 7th. The infiltration of thousands of terrorists through multiple locations simultaneously was the main factor that hindered the security forces' arrival at the combat zones. This issue, which appears in several inquiries, is at the center of the overall inquiry regarding force deployment and will be presented later.
For the inquiry, the team divided Kibbutz Be'eri into four areas of inquiry. In each area, the mapping and construction of a dedicated timeline was carried out from the beginning of the Hamas attack on October 7th until operational control was regained and the area was cleared of terrorists. In each area, the forces' arrangements at each stage during the days of combat, the conduct of the forces and additional key events are described.
The timeline was divided and examined by the inquiry team according to six main stages:
1. The beginning of the attack and the movement of terrorists from the Gaza Strip to Kibbutz Be'eri (from 06:30 to 06:45 on 07.10).
2. The start of the ground assault on Be'eri (from 06:45 to 09:00 on 07.10). At this stage, the first terrorists infiltrated the kibbutz from two directions. The battle at this stage was fought by members of the civilian rapid response team and kibbutz residents who joined the fight.
3. The enemy gains control of the kibbutz (from 09:00 to 13:30 on 07.10). During this stage, the civilian rapid response team members and residents of Kibbutz Be'eri continue to fight, stabilizing a defensive line to halt the onslaught. The first IDF soldiers arrive, are hit, evacuate the wounded, exit the kibbutz, and, positioning themselves at the entrance of the kibbutz, engage in combat with the terrorists who reached the gate. By the end of this stage, the enemy completes the abductions from Kibbutz Be'eri. Due to the multiple attack points and operational difficulties in moving along roads and deploying organic forces, the decision was made to appoint a senior commander to lead the forces arriving in the area and manage the combat.
4. The phase of halting the enemy (from 13:30 to 22:00 on 07.10). At this stage, a more significant presence of security forces begin to arrive at Kibbutz Be'eri. At 16:15, the 99th Division establishes itself at Kibbutz Be'eri and begins organizing command and control. By 18:00, about 700 IDF soldiers and security forces are operating in the area of the kibbutz. From the afternoon, efforts to evacuate the residents begin.
5. Restoring operational control over the kibbutz area (from 22:00 to 05:00, the night between 07.10 and 08.10). At this stage, the main evacuation of the residents takes place, and most of the area of the kibbutz is searched. By the end of this stage, security forces have regained operational control of Kibbutz Be'eri.
6. Searches continue and the kibbutz is cleared of terrorists (from 05:00 to 15:00 on 08.10). At this stage, a repeated sweep of the kibbutz takes place, and combat continues in several isolated points.
Main Conclusions of the Kibbutz Be'eri Inquiry:
A. Scenario and Preparedness- The IDF was not prepared for the extensive infiltration scenario that occurred on October 7th, involving multiple infiltration points by thousands of terrorists attacking dozens of locations simultaneously. The type of scenario the forces trained for focused on isolated and specific infiltrations. The forces trained for that scenario, and had determined the proper deployment of forces. As a result, there were no additional reserve forces in the area that could have been sent to Kibbutz Be'eri. All IDF reinforcement forces were sent to the area, and their deployment will be examined in the general inquiry.
The issue of preparedness and training is still being examined as part of a comprehensive inquiry into the defense and intelligence concepts.
B. Forming the Situational Assessment- The IDF struggled to create a clear and accurate situational assessment of what was happening in the kibbutz until the afternoon of October 7, even though the local community emergency team had made an updated situational assessment of the events in the kibbutz in the morning. The inquiry found that the security officials did not provide sufficient warning to the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri about the infiltration of terrorists during the initial hours of the terrorist attack.
C. Beginning of the Battle in the Kibbutz- Until 13:30, the combat within the kibbutz was primarily conducted by the civilian rapid response teams and kibbutz residents. For the first seven hours of combat, the kibbutz residents defended themselves; their actions and resourcefulness prevented the enemy from expanding the attack to additional neighborhoods. The residents continued to fight even after the arrival of IDF soldiers, guiding them and fighting alongside them.
D. Command and Control- Due to the multiple focal points and difficulty in forming a situational assessment, the combat in the area during the initial hours was characterized by a lack of command and control, a lack of coordination, and a lack of order among the different forces and units. This led to several incidents where security forces grouped at the entrance to the kibbutz without immediately engaging in combat. Several reasons were found for this including: some forces did not enter the fight because of a command decision to wait in order to evacuate civilians from Kibbutz Be'eri, forces that were fighting and exited the kibbutz based on a command decision, forces that entered after about an hour because they were waiting for the force commander, and other forces that were outside the community in order to set up a perimeter. This lack of order characterized many combat focal points during October 7th and is currently being examined as part of the general inquiry. Due to the multiple focal points and the need for urgent solutions, a senior commander was appointed for each major combat focal point to deploy the arriving forces in the sector in an optimal and coordinated manner, rather than relying on organic forces, which would have taken a long time. The decision made by the General Staff and the Southern Command to assign Brigadier General Barak Hiram to command the sector, and subsequently Kibbutz Be'eri, significantly increased operational effectiveness against the enemy, provided a response to the residents of the kibbutz, and created clarity in the situational assessment and proper command of the combat forces. This was the "turning point" that led to regaining operational control of the kibbutz. Despite operational errors and mistakes in force deployment, the inquiry team noted that the combat in Be'eri included a series of acts of heroism and supreme courage by the fighting forces, commanders, and security personnel who fought in the kibbutz, saving many residents.
E. Conduct of Forces towards Civilians- There were instances where IDF soldiers acted inappropriately in their conduct towards civilians, particularly in the security provided to the residents that were evacuated, and in the addressing of basic needs by the security forces.
F. The Hostage Event at the Home of Pessi Cohen z”l- The inquiry team found that during the incident, the forces operated within an organized command and control framework, which included a dedicated command from the Israel Police, ISA and the IDF, and received real-time intelligence and aerial support. The inquiry revealed that under the complex and difficult circumstances, the commanders and forces made professional and responsible decisions, and fully exhausted negotiation efforts. The tank fire towards the area near the house was carried out professionally, with a joint decision made by commanders from all the security organizations after careful consideration and a situational assessment was made, with the intent to apply pressure to the terrorists and save the civilians held hostage inside. After gunfire was heard from within the house and the terrorists communicated their intent to commit suicide and kill the hostages, the security forces decided to breach the house to attempt to save the hostages, and conducted combat operations under difficult conditions.
The inquiry team noted that the hostages held in the house demonstrated great resourcefulness, making significant efforts to contact and guide the security forces. The inquiry team presented their findings on the circumstances of each civilian's death to the bereaved families. The team determined that, based on the information reviewed and to the best of their understanding, no civilians inside the building were harmed by tank shell fire, except for an isolated incident outside the building where two civilians were injured by shrapnel. The team determined that most of the hostages were likely murdered by the terrorists, and further inquiries and reviews of additional findings are necessary. Regarding the performance of the senior commanders at the scene, the inquiry team found that they acted in coordination and with professionalism in the face of a difficult and complex situation.
The Chief of the General Staff accepted all the conclusions and insights from the inquiry, and determined that these takeaways should be integrated into defensive and operational plans. The Chief of the General Staff expressed his appreciation to the inquiry team for a serious, sharp, and professional inquiry that provides a clear picture despite the challenges and complexities.
The Chief of the General Staff highlighted the following conclusions and insights:
A. The IDF did not fulfill its mission to defend the residents in the most grave manner and failed in its mission.
B. The fighting of the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri, led by the members of the civilian rapid response team, was conducted with determination and courage. Their bravery, defending the kibbutz and its residents with their bodies, should be highly commended. This combat prevented the total capture of the kibbutz and saved many lives. Alongside them, the Chief of General Staff commended the actions of the members of the local community emergency team for providing an updated situational assessment and maintaining contact with residents of the kibbutz while under fire.
C. The actions of the forces- Many members of the security forces fought bravely in Kibbutz Be'eri and performed acts of heroism. However, severe mistakes and errors were made, and it is our duty to learn, strengthen, and make corrections for the future.
D. Arrival of reinforcement forces- The Chief of the General Staff noted that the critical question in all the battle inquiries is the reason for the delayed arrival of security forces at the beginning of the fighting in the communities. The Chief of the General Staff pointed out that this inquiry provides the principal answer that the simultaneous attacks on many communities and military outposts, as well as the blocked access roads, made it difficult to fulfill our mission. The specific reasons will be examined in the general inquiry.
E. Forces Waiting Outside the Kibbutz- From the afternoon hours onwards, forces were waiting outside the kibbutz while the massacre continued inside. This situation is extremely grave and cannot occur. The reasons for this were found to include that commanders who arrived with forces entered the kibbutz with a part of the force to better understand the situation; some forces did not initiate contact since they did not understand the severity of the situation and the lack of adequate forces; some of those waiting outside were support forces providing a perimeter for those engaged in combat inside the kibbutz. We must clarify a clear directive – in such a situation, all forces must enter the conflict area and do everything they can to stop the massacre of civilians. From 13:30 onwards, many combat forces from the IDF, ISA and the Israel Police began to gather in the kibbutz. These forces initiated contact and fought bravely and courageously until Monday morning, after which all the terrorists in the kibbutz had been killed.
F. Prioritizing Civilian Protection over Protection of Security Forces- In some cases, security forces fought to defend a position and evacuate and treat wounded soldiers before doing so for civilians. The inquiry found that these instances were due to difficulties in forming a complete situational assessment, leading forces under attack to act in self-defense. It is imperative to reinforce the directive to prioritize civilian protection as the highest-priority mission before doing anything else. Soldiers must always give priority to assisting civilians in evacuation, defense and any other need that arises in a combat zone. This is a crucial value that must be ingrained in soldiers from basic training and onwards. It should be noted that there were also instances in which this ideal was upheld by soldiers.
G. Participation of Senior Commanders in Combat- Many senior commanders, in both active and reserve service, left their homes and arrived at battle zones ready to fight. This action is exemplary and deserves great appreciation. The Chief of the General Staff noted that a senior commander in the field should aim to provide added value as a commander: to command, lead, make decisions for solutions and lead the implementation of such decisions.
H. The Hostage Event at the Home of Pessi Cohen z”l- The Chief of the General Staff determined that this was a unique event in its characteristics, involving a hostage situation in an active combat zone. In such events, the commander on the ground must make difficult decisions with the goal of saving as many civilians as possible. The inquiry revealed that this value guided the decision-making of the commanders on the ground during this event. The judgment and management of the event by the security forces present were conducted professionally and values-based, using the means available, including negotiation, intelligence and operating the tank as a last resort to apply pressure to the terrorists.
I. The Chief of the General Staff concluded that the inquiry of the battle in Kibbutz Be'eri is the first part of a comprehensive internal inquiry process currently being conducted by the IDF, examining the events of October 7th and what led up to these events. Although this is the first and only inquiry so far, and does not reflect the full picture of what occurred on that day, it clearly illustrates the magnitude of the failure and the scale of the disaster that befell the residents of the south who defended their families with their bodies for many hours while the IDF was not there to protect them.
J. At the end of the inquiry process, that will allow the formation of a complete picture of the series of events, decisions will be made and implications will be drawn, in addition to the operational conclusions that will be implemented in the immediate time frame.
K. We bear the responsibility and duty to conduct a thorough and deep inquiry process in order to learn, strengthen, and improve the defense that the civilians of Israel deserve. This is in-depth learning so that profound changes will be made to strengthen the IDF in its mission to protect the civilians of the State of Israel.
This is our duty to the Israeli public in general and to the residents of the south in particular.
The inquiry team determined that the IDF failed in its mission to protect the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri; the bravery of the Be'eri residents and the members of the kibbutz's civilian rapid response team is commendable and was crucial in stabilizing the defensive line during the first hours of combat, preventing the attack from spreading to other parts of the kibbutz.
In the attack on the kibbutz, 101 civilians were killed, and 30 hostages from Kibbutz Be’eri and two additional hostages were abducted and taken into Gaza, 11 of whom are still being held in Gaza. The security forces who fought in the area operated with great bravery and heroism. During the battle, 31 security personnel fell, including 23 IDF soldiers and members of the civilian rapid response team and eight officers of the Israel Police. Many soldiers and civilians were also injured.
The findings reveal that approximately 340 terrorists infiltrated the kibbutz, including about 100 Nukhba terrorist operatives of Hamas, who carried out murderous massacres, abductions of hostages, looting, and other brutal crimes. According to updated estimates from the inquiry team, about 100 terrorists were eliminated within the kibbutz. The houses in the kibbutz sustained heavy damage, and the recovery process for the kibbutz is expected to take a long time.
The inquiry was conducted by Maj. Gen. (res.) Mickey Edelstein and members of the inquiry team, including Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Dr. Oded Megiddo, Major (res.) Dror Engelstein and Captain (res.) Shir Dani.
The members of the team are not part of the chain of command and were not involved in the events themselves.
The inquiry, which lasted around three months, included hundreds of hours of conversations and interviews with the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri, members of the civilian rapid response teams, and security forces that operated in the area during the initial days of the war. Thousands of data points and materials were collected to create as clear and accurate a picture of the events as possible. As part of this, the team members gathered recordings of all communications of the security forces, examined communications among kibbutz members (with their consent), and collected supplementary intelligence and interrogation materials from terrorists captured at the beginning of the war. Additionally, the team compiled video footage, observation records, and field reconstructions. The inquiry was conducted in collaboration with the Israel Security Agency (ISA) and the Israel Police, whose forces operated in the kibbutz as well.
The inquiry is an operational military inquiry that focuses on the sequence of events, combat management, and the conduct of the security forces. It examined the battle in Kibbutz Be'eri, which was one of dozens of combat focal points during the surprise attack on October 7th. The infiltration of thousands of terrorists through multiple locations simultaneously was the main factor that hindered the security forces' arrival at the combat zones. This issue, which appears in several inquiries, is at the center of the overall inquiry regarding force deployment and will be presented later.
For the inquiry, the team divided Kibbutz Be'eri into four areas of inquiry. In each area, the mapping and construction of a dedicated timeline was carried out from the beginning of the Hamas attack on October 7th until operational control was regained and the area was cleared of terrorists. In each area, the forces' arrangements at each stage during the days of combat, the conduct of the forces and additional key events are described.
The timeline was divided and examined by the inquiry team according to six main stages:
1. The beginning of the attack and the movement of terrorists from the Gaza Strip to Kibbutz Be'eri (from 06:30 to 06:45 on 07.10).
2. The start of the ground assault on Be'eri (from 06:45 to 09:00 on 07.10). At this stage, the first terrorists infiltrated the kibbutz from two directions. The battle at this stage was fought by members of the civilian rapid response team and kibbutz residents who joined the fight.
3. The enemy gains control of the kibbutz (from 09:00 to 13:30 on 07.10). During this stage, the civilian rapid response team members and residents of Kibbutz Be'eri continue to fight, stabilizing a defensive line to halt the onslaught. The first IDF soldiers arrive, are hit, evacuate the wounded, exit the kibbutz, and, positioning themselves at the entrance of the kibbutz, engage in combat with the terrorists who reached the gate. By the end of this stage, the enemy completes the abductions from Kibbutz Be'eri. Due to the multiple attack points and operational difficulties in moving along roads and deploying organic forces, the decision was made to appoint a senior commander to lead the forces arriving in the area and manage the combat.
4. The phase of halting the enemy (from 13:30 to 22:00 on 07.10). At this stage, a more significant presence of security forces begin to arrive at Kibbutz Be'eri. At 16:15, the 99th Division establishes itself at Kibbutz Be'eri and begins organizing command and control. By 18:00, about 700 IDF soldiers and security forces are operating in the area of the kibbutz. From the afternoon, efforts to evacuate the residents begin.
5. Restoring operational control over the kibbutz area (from 22:00 to 05:00, the night between 07.10 and 08.10). At this stage, the main evacuation of the residents takes place, and most of the area of the kibbutz is searched. By the end of this stage, security forces have regained operational control of Kibbutz Be'eri.
6. Searches continue and the kibbutz is cleared of terrorists (from 05:00 to 15:00 on 08.10). At this stage, a repeated sweep of the kibbutz takes place, and combat continues in several isolated points.
Main Conclusions of the Kibbutz Be'eri Inquiry:
A. Scenario and Preparedness- The IDF was not prepared for the extensive infiltration scenario that occurred on October 7th, involving multiple infiltration points by thousands of terrorists attacking dozens of locations simultaneously. The type of scenario the forces trained for focused on isolated and specific infiltrations. The forces trained for that scenario, and had determined the proper deployment of forces. As a result, there were no additional reserve forces in the area that could have been sent to Kibbutz Be'eri. All IDF reinforcement forces were sent to the area, and their deployment will be examined in the general inquiry.
The issue of preparedness and training is still being examined as part of a comprehensive inquiry into the defense and intelligence concepts.
B. Forming the Situational Assessment- The IDF struggled to create a clear and accurate situational assessment of what was happening in the kibbutz until the afternoon of October 7, even though the local community emergency team had made an updated situational assessment of the events in the kibbutz in the morning. The inquiry found that the security officials did not provide sufficient warning to the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri about the infiltration of terrorists during the initial hours of the terrorist attack.
C. Beginning of the Battle in the Kibbutz- Until 13:30, the combat within the kibbutz was primarily conducted by the civilian rapid response teams and kibbutz residents. For the first seven hours of combat, the kibbutz residents defended themselves; their actions and resourcefulness prevented the enemy from expanding the attack to additional neighborhoods. The residents continued to fight even after the arrival of IDF soldiers, guiding them and fighting alongside them.
D. Command and Control- Due to the multiple focal points and difficulty in forming a situational assessment, the combat in the area during the initial hours was characterized by a lack of command and control, a lack of coordination, and a lack of order among the different forces and units. This led to several incidents where security forces grouped at the entrance to the kibbutz without immediately engaging in combat. Several reasons were found for this including: some forces did not enter the fight because of a command decision to wait in order to evacuate civilians from Kibbutz Be'eri, forces that were fighting and exited the kibbutz based on a command decision, forces that entered after about an hour because they were waiting for the force commander, and other forces that were outside the community in order to set up a perimeter. This lack of order characterized many combat focal points during October 7th and is currently being examined as part of the general inquiry. Due to the multiple focal points and the need for urgent solutions, a senior commander was appointed for each major combat focal point to deploy the arriving forces in the sector in an optimal and coordinated manner, rather than relying on organic forces, which would have taken a long time. The decision made by the General Staff and the Southern Command to assign Brigadier General Barak Hiram to command the sector, and subsequently Kibbutz Be'eri, significantly increased operational effectiveness against the enemy, provided a response to the residents of the kibbutz, and created clarity in the situational assessment and proper command of the combat forces. This was the "turning point" that led to regaining operational control of the kibbutz. Despite operational errors and mistakes in force deployment, the inquiry team noted that the combat in Be'eri included a series of acts of heroism and supreme courage by the fighting forces, commanders, and security personnel who fought in the kibbutz, saving many residents.
E. Conduct of Forces towards Civilians- There were instances where IDF soldiers acted inappropriately in their conduct towards civilians, particularly in the security provided to the residents that were evacuated, and in the addressing of basic needs by the security forces.
F. The Hostage Event at the Home of Pessi Cohen z”l- The inquiry team found that during the incident, the forces operated within an organized command and control framework, which included a dedicated command from the Israel Police, ISA and the IDF, and received real-time intelligence and aerial support. The inquiry revealed that under the complex and difficult circumstances, the commanders and forces made professional and responsible decisions, and fully exhausted negotiation efforts. The tank fire towards the area near the house was carried out professionally, with a joint decision made by commanders from all the security organizations after careful consideration and a situational assessment was made, with the intent to apply pressure to the terrorists and save the civilians held hostage inside. After gunfire was heard from within the house and the terrorists communicated their intent to commit suicide and kill the hostages, the security forces decided to breach the house to attempt to save the hostages, and conducted combat operations under difficult conditions.
The inquiry team noted that the hostages held in the house demonstrated great resourcefulness, making significant efforts to contact and guide the security forces. The inquiry team presented their findings on the circumstances of each civilian's death to the bereaved families. The team determined that, based on the information reviewed and to the best of their understanding, no civilians inside the building were harmed by tank shell fire, except for an isolated incident outside the building where two civilians were injured by shrapnel. The team determined that most of the hostages were likely murdered by the terrorists, and further inquiries and reviews of additional findings are necessary. Regarding the performance of the senior commanders at the scene, the inquiry team found that they acted in coordination and with professionalism in the face of a difficult and complex situation.
The Chief of the General Staff accepted all the conclusions and insights from the inquiry, and determined that these takeaways should be integrated into defensive and operational plans. The Chief of the General Staff expressed his appreciation to the inquiry team for a serious, sharp, and professional inquiry that provides a clear picture despite the challenges and complexities.
The Chief of the General Staff highlighted the following conclusions and insights:
A. The IDF did not fulfill its mission to defend the residents in the most grave manner and failed in its mission.
B. The fighting of the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri, led by the members of the civilian rapid response team, was conducted with determination and courage. Their bravery, defending the kibbutz and its residents with their bodies, should be highly commended. This combat prevented the total capture of the kibbutz and saved many lives. Alongside them, the Chief of General Staff commended the actions of the members of the local community emergency team for providing an updated situational assessment and maintaining contact with residents of the kibbutz while under fire.
C. The actions of the forces- Many members of the security forces fought bravely in Kibbutz Be'eri and performed acts of heroism. However, severe mistakes and errors were made, and it is our duty to learn, strengthen, and make corrections for the future.
D. Arrival of reinforcement forces- The Chief of the General Staff noted that the critical question in all the battle inquiries is the reason for the delayed arrival of security forces at the beginning of the fighting in the communities. The Chief of the General Staff pointed out that this inquiry provides the principal answer that the simultaneous attacks on many communities and military outposts, as well as the blocked access roads, made it difficult to fulfill our mission. The specific reasons will be examined in the general inquiry.
E. Forces Waiting Outside the Kibbutz- From the afternoon hours onwards, forces were waiting outside the kibbutz while the massacre continued inside. This situation is extremely grave and cannot occur. The reasons for this were found to include that commanders who arrived with forces entered the kibbutz with a part of the force to better understand the situation; some forces did not initiate contact since they did not understand the severity of the situation and the lack of adequate forces; some of those waiting outside were support forces providing a perimeter for those engaged in combat inside the kibbutz. We must clarify a clear directive – in such a situation, all forces must enter the conflict area and do everything they can to stop the massacre of civilians. From 13:30 onwards, many combat forces from the IDF, ISA and the Israel Police began to gather in the kibbutz. These forces initiated contact and fought bravely and courageously until Monday morning, after which all the terrorists in the kibbutz had been killed.
F. Prioritizing Civilian Protection over Protection of Security Forces- In some cases, security forces fought to defend a position and evacuate and treat wounded soldiers before doing so for civilians. The inquiry found that these instances were due to difficulties in forming a complete situational assessment, leading forces under attack to act in self-defense. It is imperative to reinforce the directive to prioritize civilian protection as the highest-priority mission before doing anything else. Soldiers must always give priority to assisting civilians in evacuation, defense and any other need that arises in a combat zone. This is a crucial value that must be ingrained in soldiers from basic training and onwards. It should be noted that there were also instances in which this ideal was upheld by soldiers.
G. Participation of Senior Commanders in Combat- Many senior commanders, in both active and reserve service, left their homes and arrived at battle zones ready to fight. This action is exemplary and deserves great appreciation. The Chief of the General Staff noted that a senior commander in the field should aim to provide added value as a commander: to command, lead, make decisions for solutions and lead the implementation of such decisions.
H. The Hostage Event at the Home of Pessi Cohen z”l- The Chief of the General Staff determined that this was a unique event in its characteristics, involving a hostage situation in an active combat zone. In such events, the commander on the ground must make difficult decisions with the goal of saving as many civilians as possible. The inquiry revealed that this value guided the decision-making of the commanders on the ground during this event. The judgment and management of the event by the security forces present were conducted professionally and values-based, using the means available, including negotiation, intelligence and operating the tank as a last resort to apply pressure to the terrorists.
I. The Chief of the General Staff concluded that the inquiry of the battle in Kibbutz Be'eri is the first part of a comprehensive internal inquiry process currently being conducted by the IDF, examining the events of October 7th and what led up to these events. Although this is the first and only inquiry so far, and does not reflect the full picture of what occurred on that day, it clearly illustrates the magnitude of the failure and the scale of the disaster that befell the residents of the south who defended their families with their bodies for many hours while the IDF was not there to protect them.
J. At the end of the inquiry process, that will allow the formation of a complete picture of the series of events, decisions will be made and implications will be drawn, in addition to the operational conclusions that will be implemented in the immediate time frame.
K. We bear the responsibility and duty to conduct a thorough and deep inquiry process in order to learn, strengthen, and improve the defense that the civilians of Israel deserve. This is in-depth learning so that profound changes will be made to strengthen the IDF in its mission to protect the civilians of the State of Israel.
This is our duty to the Israeli public in general and to the residents of the south in particular.
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