IDF: Criminal Investigation Decisions Regarding 5 Incidents Examined by the General Staff Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism (FFAM)
For more than a thousand days, the IDF has been conducting intensive combat across numerous fronts, carrying out a wide range of military missions in an exceptionally complex operational reality.
As part of the IDF’s obligations under international law and Israeli domestic law, the IDF examines exceptional incidents that occurred during combat.
Several years ago, pursuant to a decision made by the Government of Israel, the General Staff Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism (FFAM) was permanently established within the IDF for the purpose of examining exceptional operational incidents.
The FFAM’s role is to conduct factual assessments of exceptional operational incidents, while using a range of tools and methodologies.
The FFAM's factual assessments assist IDF commanders in making command decisions regarding relevant consequences of an incident and serve the Military Prosecution when deciding whether to initiate a criminal investigation of an incident.
Since the beginning of the war, the FFAM has completed the review of approximately 150 incidents and transferred them to the Military Prosecution for examination. Recently, the Military Prosecution has made decisions as set forth below in five incidents.
1. The Deaths of Seven World Central Kitchen (WCK) Employees and Damage to its Vehicles in Deir al-Balah, April 2024
On April 1, 2024, during a WCK operation to transfer humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip, fire was directed at vehicles belonging to the organization, resulting in the deaths of seven of its employees.
The findings of the examination indicate that, on that day, IDF troops identified a gunman on a truck in the humanitarian aid convoy while it was on a route to a warehouse for the unloading of the aid. The troops also identified vehicles surrounding the trucks in a manner that, in their assessment, and based on accumulated operational experience, corresponded to a scenario in which the Hamas terrorist organization had taken control of the convoy.
The examination further found that WCK employees had hired an armed security force to accompany the convoy until the completion of the operation in order to protect it from seizure by armed actors in Gaza. This was done due to the convoy’s delayed departure, during nighttime hours, from the pier at which the aid had been collected, toward the warehouse where the aid was to be unloaded. The presence of this armed security force in the organization’s vehicles was not coordinated with IDF authorities.
After the convoy arrived at the designated warehouse and unloaded the aid, several individuals were mistakenly – as later became apparent – identified as armed persons. Those individuals entered vehicles that began travelling south from the warehouse, deviating from the route that the organization had coordinated in advance with the IDF. Accordingly, and in light of the assessment that Hamas operatives had taken control of the convoy before its arrival at the warehouse, the IDF mistakenly believed that the vehicles contained Hamas military operatives and therefore struck the vehicles.
The examination also found that, during the sequence of events described above, IDF personnel attempted to contact WCK representatives in order to verify their assessment that the people in the vehicles were indeed not members of WCK. These attempts, made during the approximately half-hour period in which the convoy vehicles were tracked on the understanding that they contained Hamas operatives, were unsuccessful.
After the findings of the initial examination were presented to the previous Chief of the General Staff, shortly after the incident, and in light of the grave consequences of the incident, he decided to remove from their positions the Brigade Humanitarian Assistance Officer (an officer with the rank of Major), and the Brigade Chief of Staff (a reserve officer with the rank of Colonel). Additionally, the Brigade Commander (an officer with the rank of Colonel), the Commander of the 162nd Division (an officer with the rank of Brigadier General), and the Commander of the Southern Command (an officer with the rank of Major General), were formally reprimanded.
In light of prior professional familiarity with one of the individuals involved in the incident, the Military Advocate General (MAG) refrained from personally making the decision in this case. The decision was therefore made by the Chief Military Prosecutor in the MAG Corps.
Following review of all findings of the factual assessment, it was determined that, notwithstanding serious failures in the process that led to the assessment that Hamas operatives were travelling in the vehicles, the decisions of the commanders did not raise reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct. This conclusion was reached in view of the sequence of suspicious indicators and the totality of the operational circumstances.
Accordingly, it was determined that there is no reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct that would justify the opening of a criminal investigation or the taking of additional measures against any of those involved in the incident, beyond those described above.
2. Fire Toward a Vehicle of the Hamada Family and Toward an Ambulance, resulting in the Deaths of Nine Persons, Including the Child Hind Rajab, in Gaza City, January 2024
On January 29, 2024, media reports were published concerning IDF fire toward a vehicle carrying members of the Hamada family in Gaza City.
The findings of the examination indicate that IDF troops fired at a vehicle that was approaching them while travelling contrary to the advanced notice that had been published in an announcement by the IDF Spokesperson to residents of the area. According to the reports published, this vehicle belonged to the Hamada family. As a result of the fire, five of the vehicle’s passengers were killed, and two survived: Hind Rajab and her cousin Layan Hamada.
In the hours shortly after the firing, following a telephone call to rescue authorities, in which the two girls participated and later Hind alone, the movement of a Palestine Red Crescent ambulance was coordinated for the purpose of evacuating the casualties.
However, according to the allegations raised, upon the ambulance’s arrival at the scene of the incident, a shell was fired toward it, resulting in the deaths of the two paramedics travelling in it. Several days later, the bodies of the seven members of the Hamada family, including the bodies of Hind and Layan, were recovered from the vehicle. In addition, the bodies of the two paramedics were recovered from the ambulance.
Following review of the findings and due to alleged failures in the coordination of the movement of the Palestine Red Crescent ambulance, it has been decided to initiate a criminal investigation of the incident by Military Police Criminal Investigation Division (MPCID). In light of this decision, no further details can be provided beyond the above with respect to the aspects arising from the FFAM's review.
3. The Deaths of Fifteen Palestinians, Including Medical Personnel and a UN Employee, in Tel al-Sultan, March 2025
On March 23, 2025, three shooting incidents occurred toward different rescue vehicles, including a fire truck, ambulances, and a UN vehicle, during an ambush carried out by IDF troops against operatives of the Hamas terrorist organization.
The findings of the factual assessment indicate that IDF troops were preparing to conduct an operation in the Tel al-Sultan area during the early morning hours. As part of this activity, IDF troops were positioned to conduct an ambush along a central access route, as a supporting effort in advance of the operation. The troops on the ground, which were positioned in ambush, fired at a vehicle that they identified as a Hamas vehicle.
Approximately one hour later, the troops received a report regarding five vehicles moving toward them at high speed.
Thereafter, the vehicles stopped in very close proximity to the troops, and their occupants rapidly disembarked. A decision was then made to open fire toward them. Approximately fifteen minutes later, the troops fired at an additional vehicle that arrived at the scene.
It later became apparent that the vehicles struck in the first and second shooting incidents were a fire truck and ambulances, and that the vehicle struck in the third shooting incident was a Palestinian UN vehicle. In the three shooting incidents, fifteen Palestinians were killed, some of whom were medical personnel and paramedics. According to the findings of the Mechanism’s examination, six of those killed were identified as belonging to Hamas. After the incident, the troops decided to crush the vehicles and to cover the bodies with metal mesh.
In light of the findings of the examination, as presented to the Chief of the General Staff shortly after the events, the Chief of the General Staff directed that the Commander of the 14th Brigade will be issued a command remark, and that the Deputy Commander of the Golani Reconnaissance Unit conclude his position.
Following review of the findings, having found that the firing conducted during the incident raises a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct, it has been decided to initiate a criminal investigation of the incident by the MPCID. In light of this decision, no further details can be provided beyond the above with respect to the FFAM's examination.
4. The Deaths of Two Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Employees in the Khan Yunis Area, February 2024
On February 20, 2024, the IDF struck a building in Khan Yunis which was later found to belong to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). As a result of the strike, two women were killed and seven additional persons were injured.
The FFAM's examination found that, during the evening hours, IDF troops were moving along a route which the IDF did not operationally control, and that was located near Hamas combat compounds, where the presence of enemy forces in the area and its surroundings was expected. During this movement, the troops identified a building located at a topographically dominant point overlooking the route on which the troops were moving.
In light of the assessment of the troops on the ground that the building was situated in a location that posed a threat to them, and in light of the overall circumstances, a single shell was fired at one of its windows, from which the troops assessed that it would be possible to observe their movement along the route and to launch an attack.
The examination further found that, unlike other buildings in the area, the lights in the building were off, and no movement was observed in or around it prior to the firing. At the time the decision to fire was made, the troops did not have the most up-to-date information which indicated that the building was associated with MSF. It was further found that the IDF troops were unable to identify the signage bearing the organization’s name and emblem, which was located on the front of the building, since the troops were moving along a route situated behind the building.
Following review of the Mechanism’s findings, it was determined that the troops fired for a military purpose, at an object which, due to its characteristics and in the circumstances described, they assessed to be a military objective.
Although a certain gap was identified in that the troops did not possess current information indicating that the building was a known MSF site, it was determined that, in the operational circumstances described, there is no basis to initiate a criminal investigation by the MPCID regarding this incident.
Rather, in light of certain faults identified in the attack process, the Military Prosecution directed the relevant commanders to assess the need to take command measures against any of those involved.
5. The Deaths of Two Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Employees in Gaza City, November 2023
On November 18, 2023, fire was directed toward vehicles in a convoy of Médecins Sans Frontières, allegedly resulting in the deaths of two of the convoy’s passengers.
The FFAM's examination found that, on the day preceding the incident, the movement of a convoy of the organization’s personnel from Gaza City to the organization’s clinic in Khan Yunis had been coordinated with IDF authorities.
The convoy, which consisted of five vehicles, travelled along a one-way evacuation route that had been coordinated in advance, and arrived at an IDF checkpoint around midday. Final approval for the convoy’s movement was granted shortly before the convoy set out and was not known to the troops at the checkpoint.
The convoy vehicles were requested to wait until the matter was clarified and therefore waited in the vicinity of the checkpoint. After some time, out of concern that they would not reach their destination before darkness, they decided, on their own initiative and without the required coordination with the IDF, to turn back and return to the organization’s facilities in Gaza City. This occurred despite the fact that IDF soldiers had clarified to the members of the convoy that the operating hours of the checkpoint had been extended, and that the return of the convoy to Gaza City could not be coordinated at that time. They therefore requested that the convoy wait in place until the clarification was completed, after which they would continue southward to their destination. It was further clarified to them that, as the return of the convoy to Gaza City at that time could not take place within an approved coordination framework, such movement could endanger them.
As the convoy moved back toward Gaza City, different IDF troops positioned along the route identified the movement of a convoy of vehicles approaching them while travelling in the opposite direction to the approved evacuation movement from the area. In light of the identification of uncoordinated movement, which raised suspicion of a threat to the troops, the soldiers fired warning shots several times, not at the vehicles themselves, in order to prevent the vehicles from approaching them.
Notwithstanding the above, the vehicles continued travelling and reached only several hundred meters from IDF troops, in a manner perceived by the troops as an actual threat, including in light of the patterns of activity of terrorist organizations in the area. Accordingly, soldiers fired additional warning shots toward the road, in accordance with the applicable orders, approximately one hundred meters from the location of the vehicles, which at that time were at the head of the convoy.
According to the findings of the examination, it was found that there is a possibility that the regrettable deaths of the two convoy passengers were caused by bullet ricochet or bullet splash from the warning fire. In any event, it was not found that direct fire was aimed at the convoy at any stage.
In these circumstances, it was determined that the incident does not raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct so there is no basis to initiate a criminal investigation by the MPCID
As part of the IDF’s obligations under international law and Israeli domestic law, the IDF examines exceptional incidents that occurred during combat.
Several years ago, pursuant to a decision made by the Government of Israel, the General Staff Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism (FFAM) was permanently established within the IDF for the purpose of examining exceptional operational incidents.
The FFAM’s role is to conduct factual assessments of exceptional operational incidents, while using a range of tools and methodologies.
The FFAM's factual assessments assist IDF commanders in making command decisions regarding relevant consequences of an incident and serve the Military Prosecution when deciding whether to initiate a criminal investigation of an incident.
Since the beginning of the war, the FFAM has completed the review of approximately 150 incidents and transferred them to the Military Prosecution for examination. Recently, the Military Prosecution has made decisions as set forth below in five incidents.
1. The Deaths of Seven World Central Kitchen (WCK) Employees and Damage to its Vehicles in Deir al-Balah, April 2024
On April 1, 2024, during a WCK operation to transfer humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip, fire was directed at vehicles belonging to the organization, resulting in the deaths of seven of its employees.
The findings of the examination indicate that, on that day, IDF troops identified a gunman on a truck in the humanitarian aid convoy while it was on a route to a warehouse for the unloading of the aid. The troops also identified vehicles surrounding the trucks in a manner that, in their assessment, and based on accumulated operational experience, corresponded to a scenario in which the Hamas terrorist organization had taken control of the convoy.
The examination further found that WCK employees had hired an armed security force to accompany the convoy until the completion of the operation in order to protect it from seizure by armed actors in Gaza. This was done due to the convoy’s delayed departure, during nighttime hours, from the pier at which the aid had been collected, toward the warehouse where the aid was to be unloaded. The presence of this armed security force in the organization’s vehicles was not coordinated with IDF authorities.
After the convoy arrived at the designated warehouse and unloaded the aid, several individuals were mistakenly – as later became apparent – identified as armed persons. Those individuals entered vehicles that began travelling south from the warehouse, deviating from the route that the organization had coordinated in advance with the IDF. Accordingly, and in light of the assessment that Hamas operatives had taken control of the convoy before its arrival at the warehouse, the IDF mistakenly believed that the vehicles contained Hamas military operatives and therefore struck the vehicles.
The examination also found that, during the sequence of events described above, IDF personnel attempted to contact WCK representatives in order to verify their assessment that the people in the vehicles were indeed not members of WCK. These attempts, made during the approximately half-hour period in which the convoy vehicles were tracked on the understanding that they contained Hamas operatives, were unsuccessful.
After the findings of the initial examination were presented to the previous Chief of the General Staff, shortly after the incident, and in light of the grave consequences of the incident, he decided to remove from their positions the Brigade Humanitarian Assistance Officer (an officer with the rank of Major), and the Brigade Chief of Staff (a reserve officer with the rank of Colonel). Additionally, the Brigade Commander (an officer with the rank of Colonel), the Commander of the 162nd Division (an officer with the rank of Brigadier General), and the Commander of the Southern Command (an officer with the rank of Major General), were formally reprimanded.
In light of prior professional familiarity with one of the individuals involved in the incident, the Military Advocate General (MAG) refrained from personally making the decision in this case. The decision was therefore made by the Chief Military Prosecutor in the MAG Corps.
Following review of all findings of the factual assessment, it was determined that, notwithstanding serious failures in the process that led to the assessment that Hamas operatives were travelling in the vehicles, the decisions of the commanders did not raise reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct. This conclusion was reached in view of the sequence of suspicious indicators and the totality of the operational circumstances.
Accordingly, it was determined that there is no reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct that would justify the opening of a criminal investigation or the taking of additional measures against any of those involved in the incident, beyond those described above.
2. Fire Toward a Vehicle of the Hamada Family and Toward an Ambulance, resulting in the Deaths of Nine Persons, Including the Child Hind Rajab, in Gaza City, January 2024
On January 29, 2024, media reports were published concerning IDF fire toward a vehicle carrying members of the Hamada family in Gaza City.
The findings of the examination indicate that IDF troops fired at a vehicle that was approaching them while travelling contrary to the advanced notice that had been published in an announcement by the IDF Spokesperson to residents of the area. According to the reports published, this vehicle belonged to the Hamada family. As a result of the fire, five of the vehicle’s passengers were killed, and two survived: Hind Rajab and her cousin Layan Hamada.
In the hours shortly after the firing, following a telephone call to rescue authorities, in which the two girls participated and later Hind alone, the movement of a Palestine Red Crescent ambulance was coordinated for the purpose of evacuating the casualties.
However, according to the allegations raised, upon the ambulance’s arrival at the scene of the incident, a shell was fired toward it, resulting in the deaths of the two paramedics travelling in it. Several days later, the bodies of the seven members of the Hamada family, including the bodies of Hind and Layan, were recovered from the vehicle. In addition, the bodies of the two paramedics were recovered from the ambulance.
Following review of the findings and due to alleged failures in the coordination of the movement of the Palestine Red Crescent ambulance, it has been decided to initiate a criminal investigation of the incident by Military Police Criminal Investigation Division (MPCID). In light of this decision, no further details can be provided beyond the above with respect to the aspects arising from the FFAM's review.
3. The Deaths of Fifteen Palestinians, Including Medical Personnel and a UN Employee, in Tel al-Sultan, March 2025
On March 23, 2025, three shooting incidents occurred toward different rescue vehicles, including a fire truck, ambulances, and a UN vehicle, during an ambush carried out by IDF troops against operatives of the Hamas terrorist organization.
The findings of the factual assessment indicate that IDF troops were preparing to conduct an operation in the Tel al-Sultan area during the early morning hours. As part of this activity, IDF troops were positioned to conduct an ambush along a central access route, as a supporting effort in advance of the operation. The troops on the ground, which were positioned in ambush, fired at a vehicle that they identified as a Hamas vehicle.
Approximately one hour later, the troops received a report regarding five vehicles moving toward them at high speed.
Thereafter, the vehicles stopped in very close proximity to the troops, and their occupants rapidly disembarked. A decision was then made to open fire toward them. Approximately fifteen minutes later, the troops fired at an additional vehicle that arrived at the scene.
It later became apparent that the vehicles struck in the first and second shooting incidents were a fire truck and ambulances, and that the vehicle struck in the third shooting incident was a Palestinian UN vehicle. In the three shooting incidents, fifteen Palestinians were killed, some of whom were medical personnel and paramedics. According to the findings of the Mechanism’s examination, six of those killed were identified as belonging to Hamas. After the incident, the troops decided to crush the vehicles and to cover the bodies with metal mesh.
In light of the findings of the examination, as presented to the Chief of the General Staff shortly after the events, the Chief of the General Staff directed that the Commander of the 14th Brigade will be issued a command remark, and that the Deputy Commander of the Golani Reconnaissance Unit conclude his position.
Following review of the findings, having found that the firing conducted during the incident raises a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct, it has been decided to initiate a criminal investigation of the incident by the MPCID. In light of this decision, no further details can be provided beyond the above with respect to the FFAM's examination.
4. The Deaths of Two Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Employees in the Khan Yunis Area, February 2024
On February 20, 2024, the IDF struck a building in Khan Yunis which was later found to belong to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). As a result of the strike, two women were killed and seven additional persons were injured.
The FFAM's examination found that, during the evening hours, IDF troops were moving along a route which the IDF did not operationally control, and that was located near Hamas combat compounds, where the presence of enemy forces in the area and its surroundings was expected. During this movement, the troops identified a building located at a topographically dominant point overlooking the route on which the troops were moving.
In light of the assessment of the troops on the ground that the building was situated in a location that posed a threat to them, and in light of the overall circumstances, a single shell was fired at one of its windows, from which the troops assessed that it would be possible to observe their movement along the route and to launch an attack.
The examination further found that, unlike other buildings in the area, the lights in the building were off, and no movement was observed in or around it prior to the firing. At the time the decision to fire was made, the troops did not have the most up-to-date information which indicated that the building was associated with MSF. It was further found that the IDF troops were unable to identify the signage bearing the organization’s name and emblem, which was located on the front of the building, since the troops were moving along a route situated behind the building.
Following review of the Mechanism’s findings, it was determined that the troops fired for a military purpose, at an object which, due to its characteristics and in the circumstances described, they assessed to be a military objective.
Although a certain gap was identified in that the troops did not possess current information indicating that the building was a known MSF site, it was determined that, in the operational circumstances described, there is no basis to initiate a criminal investigation by the MPCID regarding this incident.
Rather, in light of certain faults identified in the attack process, the Military Prosecution directed the relevant commanders to assess the need to take command measures against any of those involved.
5. The Deaths of Two Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Employees in Gaza City, November 2023
On November 18, 2023, fire was directed toward vehicles in a convoy of Médecins Sans Frontières, allegedly resulting in the deaths of two of the convoy’s passengers.
The FFAM's examination found that, on the day preceding the incident, the movement of a convoy of the organization’s personnel from Gaza City to the organization’s clinic in Khan Yunis had been coordinated with IDF authorities.
The convoy, which consisted of five vehicles, travelled along a one-way evacuation route that had been coordinated in advance, and arrived at an IDF checkpoint around midday. Final approval for the convoy’s movement was granted shortly before the convoy set out and was not known to the troops at the checkpoint.
The convoy vehicles were requested to wait until the matter was clarified and therefore waited in the vicinity of the checkpoint. After some time, out of concern that they would not reach their destination before darkness, they decided, on their own initiative and without the required coordination with the IDF, to turn back and return to the organization’s facilities in Gaza City. This occurred despite the fact that IDF soldiers had clarified to the members of the convoy that the operating hours of the checkpoint had been extended, and that the return of the convoy to Gaza City could not be coordinated at that time. They therefore requested that the convoy wait in place until the clarification was completed, after which they would continue southward to their destination. It was further clarified to them that, as the return of the convoy to Gaza City at that time could not take place within an approved coordination framework, such movement could endanger them.
As the convoy moved back toward Gaza City, different IDF troops positioned along the route identified the movement of a convoy of vehicles approaching them while travelling in the opposite direction to the approved evacuation movement from the area. In light of the identification of uncoordinated movement, which raised suspicion of a threat to the troops, the soldiers fired warning shots several times, not at the vehicles themselves, in order to prevent the vehicles from approaching them.
Notwithstanding the above, the vehicles continued travelling and reached only several hundred meters from IDF troops, in a manner perceived by the troops as an actual threat, including in light of the patterns of activity of terrorist organizations in the area. Accordingly, soldiers fired additional warning shots toward the road, in accordance with the applicable orders, approximately one hundred meters from the location of the vehicles, which at that time were at the head of the convoy.
According to the findings of the examination, it was found that there is a possibility that the regrettable deaths of the two convoy passengers were caused by bullet ricochet or bullet splash from the warning fire. In any event, it was not found that direct fire was aimed at the convoy at any stage.
In these circumstances, it was determined that the incident does not raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct so there is no basis to initiate a criminal investigation by the MPCID
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